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Corporatization in the Public Sector: Explaining the Growth of Local 
Government Companies  
 
The creation of companies by local governments to provide public services (or corporatization) 
is an example of systemic public entrepreneurship that is popular across the world. To build 
knowledge around the antecedents of public sector entrepreneurship, we investigate the factors 
that lead local governments to create companies for public service delivery. Using zero-inflated 
negative binomial regressions to analyze secondary data from 150 major English local 
governments for 2010-2016, we find that governments with higher levels of grant and debt 
dependence are more involved in the creation and operation of companies, as are larger 
governments. Further analysis reveals that very low and very high managerial capabilities are 
strongly associated with more involvement in profit-making companies, while local 
government involvement in companies is more prevalent in deprived areas. At the same time, 
government ownership of companies is more common in areas with high economic output.  
 
 
Evidence for practice: 
 In a context of budget cuts, grant and debt dependence are leading local governments in 
England to corporatize service provision. 
 Local governments with low or high management capacity are also motivated to create and 
control more companies, especially profit-making entities. 
 Systemic entrepreneurial activity within English local governments does not depend on 
left-wing or right-wing political control. 
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Governments across the globe increasingly use publicly-owned companies to deliver public 
services (McKinlay 2013; Thynne, 2013). The process of ‘corporatization’ – the creation of 
government-owned companies – has significant and far-reaching implications for the 
governance, performance and efficiency of local public services, and, as such, it represents an 
excellent example of the systemic or corporate public entrepreneurship that can occur in large, 
complex bureaucratic organizations (Bernier and Hafsi 2007; Kearney, Hisrich and Roche 
2007). For local governments, which are at the forefront of service delivery and citizen 
demands (Arapis 2013; Rubin 1988), corporatization of service provision is a form of public 
entrepreneurship with the potential to ensure organizational “survival, sustainability and 
growth” (Lukes and Verreyenne 2006, p.5).  
Corporatization involves moving a function from hierarchical line control within a 
government bureaucracy and placing it into a wholly or partly-owned corporate entity (Thynne, 
2003). Unlike other entrepreneurial approaches to service delivery - for example contracting-
out, co-production and public-private partnerships - corporatization is still comparatively 
neglected by the academic literature (Voorn, van Genugten, and van Thiel 2017). In particular, 
despite a long history of corporatization within local government (e.g. Skelcher 2017), few 
studies examine the financial, socio-economic, managerial and political factors explaining why 
local governments set up their own companies or the types of company that are set up. 
Previous European research suggests local financial, socio-economic and political 
factors may be important influences on corporatization (e.g. Tavares and Camoes 2010; 
Rodrigues, Tavares, and Araújo 2012). Those studies have cast valuable light on the factors 
shaping local governments’ decisions to create companies, but we still need to know more 
about the managerial capabilities that underpin corporatization. Public sector capabilities are 
the organizational assets and practices that can be deployed to create public value (Klein et al., 
2013). Capabilities such as management capacity and managerial experience enable the 
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effective coordination of alternative forms of public service delivery (e.g. Cabral, 2017; Cabral, 
Lazzarini and Azevedo, 2013). In addition to better understanding of the role of capabilities, 
further research is required to clarify the factors determining the legal form of the companies 
in which local governments are involved (Tavares 2017). Locating transaction costs and 
capabilities theories within a public entrepreneurship framework, we analyze the managerial 
factors along with the financial, socio-economic and political ones influencing corporatization, 
and whether these vary according to the legal form and ownership of the company.  
When confronted with fiscal challenges and complex socio-economic circumstances, 
local governments may favour corporatization over other approaches because they retain 
control over the companies that they create (Tavares and Camoes 2007). Company creation 
may also represent a politically acceptable ‘middle-ground’ between in-house provision and 
privatization (Leavitt and Morris 2004). From a capabilities perspective, local governments 
with low administrative intensity and less managerial experience may corporatize services to 
expand their capacity for meeting citizens’ needs (McKinlay 2003). Company creation may 
also be more prevalent in governments with very high administrative intensity and managerial 
experience because they have more of the administrative resources needed to coordinate 
complex service delivery arrangements (Grossi and Reichard 2008). These capabilities 
arguments are especially likely to apply to involvement in profit-making companies and for 
companies in which local governments hold a controlling share.    
To investigate the determinants of corporatization, we analyze the creation of 
companies by all major English local governments during the financial years 2010/11 until 
2016/17.1 Since 2010/11, the UK central government has cut grant funding for local 
governments in England, and placed a 2% annual cap on their ability to raise their only 
independent source of tax revenue – a property tax, known as the ‘Council Tax' (Figure A1 in 
the Appendix illustrates these changes).2 Although there is no necessary connection between 
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grant reductions, tax limits and fiscal stress, the UK’s National Audit Office (2018) has 
highlighted that these policies threaten the financial sustainability of English local government. 
At the same time, the demand for local public services continues to increase across England as 
the population grows, with the number of older people requiring long-term care provided by 
local governments rising particularly rapidly (Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2017). Our analysis 
ends in 2016/17 as this is the last full year for which data was available. This makes the period 
in which we undertake our study an especially interesting one for researching local 
governments’ responses to fiscal challenges.  
We exploit comprehensive information from local governments’ annual accounts to 
examine what determines their involvement in different types of company and the degree of 
control that they exert over those companies. Using zero-inflated negative binomial 
regressions, we analyze the number of companies in which each local government has an 
interest, utilizing a range of financial, socio-economic, political and managerial variables: grant 
revenue reductions; grant dependence; long-term debt as a % of revenues; debt servicing as a 
% of revenues (financial); local government size; population density; age diversity; ethnic 
diversity; deprivation; and Gross Value Added per capita (socio-economic); Labour Party 
control; Conservative Party control (political); and, administrative intensity; chief executive 
tenure; and chief finance officer tenure (managerial).  
Our study suggests that corporatization is more likely in local governments with 
increased grant allocations, but also in those with higher levels of grant dependence and debt 
financing. In addition, larger local governments are more corporatized. Further analysis reveals 
that very low and very high administrative intensity is associated with involvement in 
companies, especially profit-making ones. Furthermore, while socio-economic deprivation is 
associated with company involvement per se, economic output is positively related to local 
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government ownership of companies. These results highlight that financial and socio-economic 
circumstances and managerial capabilities shape systemic public entrepreneurship.  
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
Theories of public entrepreneurship often distinguish between two main types of 
entrepreneurship: i) individual entrepreneurship, undertaken by heroic leaders seeking to 
transform public services; and, ii) systemic (or corporate) entrepreneurship, carried out across 
an organization with the aim of achieving strategic objectives (Bernier and Hafsi 2007; Hayter, 
Link and Scott 2018; Kearney, Hisrich and Roche 2007). According to Bernier and Hafsi 
(2007), public entrepreneurship follows a cycle from the birth of an organization when 
resources are available for individual entrepreneurs to experiment with services, until a point 
of stability, professionalization and routine is reached. After that, systemic entrepreneurial 
activity becomes necessary to enable the whole organization to overcome strategic persistence 
and adapt to environmental threats. The creation of companies by local governments thus 
represents entrepreneurial action undertaken to revitalize long-established bureaucracies.  
Although public organizations are sometimes assumed to be less entrepreneurial than 
private firms (Rainey and Bozeman 2000), the use of public corporations for commercial 
activities by government has a long history (see Seidman 1954). Nonetheless, company 
creation by public organizations in recent times has reflected the wider drive to make 
government more business-like in the wake of the New Public Management (NPM) (Thynne 
1994). As a result, there has been a growth in hybrid organizations with mixed forms of 
ownership and control to address an “actual or perceived crisis of legitimacy, responsiveness 
and efficiency in government” (Thynne and Wettenhall 2004, p.609).  
Corporatization potentially offers a number of benefits for public organizations. It can 
enable them to undertake commercial trading activities and thus generate new revenue (Stumm 
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1996). It can offer flexibility in employment and reward systems (Thynne 2003). And where 
companies are registered as charities or trusts, it can bring tax advantages and access to sources 
of charitable income (Babbage, Ewles and Smith 2006). At the same time though, 
corporatization can generate unwanted costs. Company creation can contribute to “fiscal 
illusion” by hiding the true scale of government activities (Arapis 2013; Tyer 1989). It may 
also make it harder to move money between different budgets (Rubin 1988) or generate 
financial instability as non-tax revenue streams can be less predictable (Carroll 2009). 
The extent to which the potential benefits of company creation can be maximized could 
depend on the legal structure chosen (Seidman 1954). In England, corporations can be 
registered as a private company limited by shares or by guarantee (the latter may also be 
registered as a charity), a joint venture public limited company, a community interest company, 
or a limited liability partnership. The degree of control that governments retain over a company 
is also likely to matter, with majority share ownership potentially key to effective co-ordination 
and oversight (Voorn, van Genugten, and van Thiel 2017).  
Local governments across England are exploring alternative service delivery models, 
such as sharing services and collaborative outsourcing (Sandford 2016); as indeed, are their 
counterparts across Europe. For example, Italian local governments are experimenting with 
community delivery of services (Cepiku, Mussari and Giordano 2016), while, in Spain, 
municipalities increasingly use public companies and other business entities to provide services 
(Ferran and Puey 2016). In this setting, corporatization may be a particularly appealing 
approach to dealing with financial pressures because governments retain significant control 
over service delivery and so reduce the transaction costs associated with doing things 
differently (Tavares and Camoes 2007). 
Where established revenue streams are drying up, local governments may create 
companies because they can better control labour costs through corporatized arrangements that 
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are less influenced by public employment regulations and trade union activism. In addition, 
dependence on intergovernmental transfers may encourage local governments to diversify their 
revenue sources, especially if, as in England, the power to increase property tax is limited. 
Dependence on loan financing may also be associated with corporatization, as local 
governments take on debt to bolster under-pressure services – something that has been 
facilitated in England by the prudential borrowing powers accorded by the Local Government 
Act of 2003. Given the ever-increasing levels of service demand in England (National Audit 
Office 2018), profit-making entities that can generate funds for reinvestment in hard-pressed 
services, reduce dependence on central government grants and be used to repay loans seem 
likely to be more attractive than non-profit entities (Localis 2015). Hence, we propose: 
 
Hypothesis 1 Financial pressures will be positively related to corporatization, especially the 
creation of profit-making companies 
 
Bernier and Hafsi (2007) emphasize that systemic entrepreneurship occurs when governments 
confront a complex external environment. The complexity of an organization’s task 
environment reflects the sheer number and diversity of human and material factors that must 
be considered in service production decisions (Dess and Beard 1984). So, for local 
governments, the number of people they serve, their geographical concentration and the 
quantity and diversity of their needs are all key indicators of socio-economic complexity. A 
high level of economic output is another potential source of complexity, as local governments 
serving more vibrant economies will probably have to address the needs of a more diverse 
range of firms and businesses (Porter 2003). These indicators all seem likely to be positively 
related to corporatization.  
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Contingency theories of organizational design have long averred that in a complex 
environment innovation is vital to meet the needs of clients and stakeholders (Donaldson 2001). 
Large local governments and those serving concentrated, deprived or heterogeneous 
populations may therefore need to explore new opportunities for service provision in response 
to the socio-economic complexity that they confront (Romero, Haubrich, and Maclean 2010). 
Since corporatization implies systemic public entrepreneurial action, local governments may 
endeavour to design corporatized services that are tailored to the specific needs of the different 
social groups they serve. However, due to uncertainty about the market for those services in 
complex socio-economic circumstances, this design process may result in the creation of not-
for-profit rather than for-profit organizations (Girth, Hefetz, Johnston and Warner 2012). 
Weisbrod (1997), for example, argues that “when populations are diverse, services that satisfy 
the majority may leave many people undersatisfied; nonprofits are thus understandable as an 
alternative mechanism for providing collective services” (542). This leads us to put forward: 
 
Hypothesis 2 Socio-economic complexity will be positively related to corporatization, 
especially the creation of not-for-profit entities. 
 
In addition to financial and socio-economic circumstances, the local political context is also 
likely to influence corporatization. In particular, the citizen-candidate model of political 
competition highlights that the ruling party’s ideological commitments usually determine a 
local government’s policy choices (Osborne and Slivinski 1996). In theory, right-wing parties 
seek to enhance public service efficiency by cutting costs, whereas left-wing parties favour 
state intervention to improve public service equity. In fact, right-wing governments across 
Europe have been linked with cost-cutting management reforms at the local and national level 
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(Wollmann 2018). Such ideological effects may be even more important during fiscally 
challenging periods.  
Systemic public entrepreneurship tends to occur in times of crisis (Bernier and Hafsi 
2007). Hence, it seems likely that the creation of companies by English local governments in 
recent times will be more prevalent in those led by the main right-wing party – the Conservative 
Party, than the main left-wing party (i.e. the Labour Party). However, while local governments 
controlled by right-wing political parties may be ideologically-inclined towards contracting-
out (Osborne and Slivinski 1996), such plans can be unpopular with local citizens. 
Corporatization may therefore enable right-wing governments to demonstrate responsiveness 
to citizens’ concerns about service continuity despite fiscal pressures (Tavares and Camoes 
2010), rendering it a politically acceptable ‘middle-ground’ between in-house provision and 
privatization (Leavitt and Morris 2004). At the same time, the pro-business orientation of right-
wing political parties may mean that they are more comfortable with the creation and operation 
of profit-making entities. In addition, right-wing politicians may have more business expertise 
and experience of managing companies, particularly those that make profits operating in a 
competitive market environment. For this reason, we advance: 
 
Hypothesis 3 Right-wing party control will be positively related to corporatization, especially 
the creation of profit-making companies 
 
From a NPM perspective, corporatization shifts control over service delivery from politicians 
and bureaucrats to professional managers motivated to find innovative service delivery 
solutions, and thereby reduce costs (Osborne and Gaebler 1992). However, systemic 
entrepreneurship of this kind is not the work of a single heroic entrepreneur, but requires ‘a 
high level of cooperation among specialized actors within the system’ (Bernier and Hafsi 2007: 
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494). Implementation of any new service delivery model may give rise to a host of 
unanticipated problems (Van de Ven, Polley, Garud, and Venkataraman 1999). For this reason, 
successful public entrepreneurship is likely to be dependent upon the quality of the 
management within a public organization (Kearney, Hisrich and Roche 2007).  
Researchers increasingly draw on capabilities theories to examine the management 
resources required to underpin effective public entrepreneurship (Klein et al., 2013). Broadly 
defined, capabilities are the organizational assets and competencies that can be deployed to 
coordinate an organization’s productive activities (Winter 2003). Public organizations with 
higher levels of administrative capacity and better quality managers may be better equipped to 
make alternative service delivery models work (Cabral 2017). Because corporatization accords 
service managers’ freedom from standard bureaucratic controls, a high degree of central 
managerial capability is essential to facilitate effective control over local government 
companies, especially those that are profit-making. At the same time though, services may be 
corporatized in order to create new capabilities that can be directed back towards system-wide 
improvements – something that may be appealing to organizations that have weaker capability 
in the first place, especially if profit-making is a concern. Hence, we suggest:  
 
Hypothesis 4 Managerial capabilities will exhibit a u-shaped relationship with corporatization 
that will be stronger for the creation of profit-making than not-for-profit entities 
 
Data and Methods 
The units of analysis for our study are the 150 single and upper tier local governments 
responsible for the provision of the largest and most important local public services across 
England. The dataset for the study has been collected from the full population of those 
governments for the financial years 2010/11 to 2016/17. They are elected bodies with a 
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Westminster-style cabinet system of political management, made up of senior members of the 
ruling political party. English local governments manage about a quarter of the total UK public 
sector budget (HM Treasury 2018) and retain a strong capacity for institutional choice. Locally 
elected politicians implement national policy frameworks on the advice of professional local 
government managers led by a chief executive officer. Strategic decisions with major financial 
implications, such as those associated with company creation, involve the chief finance officer, 
who has the legal obligation to ensure local governments balance their budgets.  
In terms of public service responsibilities, single-tier (London boroughs, metropolitan 
districts and unitary authorities) and upper-tier local governments (county councils) are 
responsible for, and may also fund or provide, services in the areas of: education (e.g. primary 
and secondary schooling), social care (e.g. services for older people), environmental services 
(e.g. waste management), highways, economic development, and leisure and culture services 
(e.g. sports centres, libraries). With the exception of county councils, they are also responsible 
for aspects of housing (e.g. sheltered accommodation and rent subsidies).3 
 
Dependent Variables 
Our first dependent variable, corporatization, is an annual count of all the companies in which 
local governments register an interest in their annual accounts for 2010/11 – 2016/17. We then 
analyze two further indicators that disaggregate corporatization according to the two main 
types of company in which governments are involved: companies limited by shares; and, 
companies limited by guarantee. Companies limited by shares are typically used for trading 
activities (e.g. property development and IT services). Companies limited by guarantee are 
used where the activity is non-profit distributing or charitable (e.g. museums or libraries). Other 
legal forms, for example charities and trusts or limited liability partnerships, are seldom used 
(see Figure 1) and are not analyzed separately. Our three indicators of corporatization are 
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recalculated to capture levels of company ownership by counting only companies in which 
governments retain 50% or more shares. The accounts from which these indicators are 
constructed are audited and publicly available, and were downloaded from local government 
websites, enabling us to build a comprehensive data set without having to request documents 
from individual governments or rely on perceptual survey-based measures. 
To identify a government’s interest in a company, the type of company in which they 
had an interest and its continued existence, a coding frame was developed and applied to the 
annual accounts. We specifically draw on International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 
10, which requires local governments to present consolidated financial statements for all 
entities they control, and IFRS 11, which determines whether a joint arrangement exists and 
the type of arrangement that it might be; as well as IFRS 12, which covers disclosure of interests 
in other entities.4 Our search procedure revealed that 676 separate companies existed at some 
time during the period 2010-2016. The adoption of these arrangements did not, of course, occur 
simultaneously, but changed year-on-year during the study period, as some companies were 
created and others were closed.  
Figure 1 shows that the number of companies in which major local governments 
registered an interest rose from nearly 400 in 2010 to almost 600 in 2016. Most of this growth 
is accounted for by increasing involvement in companies limited by shares, which grew from 
about 170 to 320, while the number of companies limited by guarantee remained fairly static. 
The number of companies depicted in Figure 1 is net of closures in any given year, which 
totalled 78 for the study period. Further analysis indicates that about 50% of the companies in 
existence at some point between 2010 and 2016, operated in the areas of land use planning and 
economic development, 30% in the areas of administration, housing and leisure, with a further 







To test our hypotheses, we draw upon sixteen financial, socio-economic, political and 
managerial variables. To gauge financial pressures, we first measure the reduction in grant 
revenue from central government using a variable capturing the annual percentage grant 
reductions (for a similar approach see Jordan 2003). We reverse the polarity of the sign for this 
variable to ensure that we capture reductions. The revenue expenditure of English local 
governments is principally financed by grants from central government (see Table A1). Hence, 
a decline in grant revenue can be regarded as a clear indication of the financial challenges that 
stimulate systemic entrepreneurship. To gauge grant dependence we measure the percentage 
of local governments’ revenue expenditure that is accounted for by central government grants 
– a measure employed in prior research (e.g. Tavares and Camões 2010). Figures for these 
measures come from the revenue expenditure statistics published by the Ministry for Housing, 
Communities and Local Government (MHCLG). 
 Our next financial measures are long-term debt (£’s) and debt-servicing expenditure 
(£’s) as a percentage of revenue expenditure. Long-term debt is calculated by summing annual 
borrowing from: negotiable bonds & commercial paper; other listed securities; Public Works 
Loan Board (PWLB)5; UK banks; building societies; other financial intermediaries; public 
corporations; private non-financial corporations; central government; household sector; and 
other sources. These figures come from the borrowing and investment statistics published by 
MHCLG. About three-quarters of local governments’ long term debt was held by the PWLB, 
with UK banks holding just over 10%. Debt-servicing figures are drawn from MHCLG revenue 
statistics. Overall, long-term debt makes up over 90% of the total debt held by local 
governments. Debt and debt servicing as a proportion of revenue expenditure are thus good 
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indicators of the potential threat to financial sustainability posed by dependence on borrowing 
to meet future needs (Kloha, Weissert, and Kleine 2005).  
We use six measures of socio-economic complexity. First, population size is measured 
using figures from the 2001 and 2011 census published by the Office of National Statistics. 
These statistics capture the full scale of local governments’ output (De Borger and Kerstens 
1996). Next, population density figures capture the geographic concentration of the population 
served by local governments. Densely populated areas have more complex social needs (Ladd 
1992), and greater interest group competition (Dahl 1961). Third, we include the Index of 
Multiple Deprivation score for each area served by a local government.6 Higher social needs 
and lower co-production capacity confront governments in deprived areas (Romero, Haubrich 
and Maclean 2010). Fourth, Hehrfindahl indices capturing the age and ethnic diversity of the 
population are included in the models. The proportions of the various sub-groups within each 
of the different categories identified by the 2001 and 2011 UK national censuses within a 
government’s jurisdiction (e.g. ages 0–4 and Black African) were squared and the sum of these 
squares subtracted from 10,000. These indices are proxies for interest group competition. 
Finally, we measure the potential effects of business interest group competition within more 
economically productive areas by using estimates of the Gross Value Added (GVA) (£’s) per 
capita for each local government published by the Office of National Statistics.  
For our analysis of political factors, right-wing party rule is measured using a 
dichotomous variable coded 1 for local governments controlled by the Conservative Party and 
0 otherwise. Left-wing party rule is measured using a dichotomous variable coded 1 for local 
governments controlled by the Labour Party and 0 otherwise. Although most governments are 
Labour or Conservative controlled, in a small number of cases they are controlled by the Liberal 
Democrat Party, the main UK centrist party, or by coalitions. Hence, we deploy both 
dichotomous variables in our models (see also Alonso, Andrews, and Hodgkinson 2016). 
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Political control statistics come from the Local Election Handbooks published annually by the 
Local Government Elections Centre, Plymouth University.  
Three measures are used to capture management capabilities within local governments. 
First, using the revenue statistics published by MHCLG, administrative intensity is measured 
as the percentage of each government’s expenditure that is spent on central services (e.g., 
finance, internal audit), and management and support services (e.g., human resources, IT). This 
type of indicator captures the administrative capacity available to coordinate service delivery 
(see Boyne and Meier 2013). Second, the variables CEO tenure and CFO tenure measure the 
length of tenure (in years) of the chief executive officer (CEO) and chief finance officer (CFO) 
for each local government. The accumulated experience of the CEO and CFO are proxies for 
managerial capability (Cabral 2017). Data on tenure length came from: Boyne et al. (2017), 
Municipal Year Books, local governments’ webpages and local newspaper articles.   
Finally, we control for the possibility that county councils register an interest in fewer 
companies than single -tier local governments because they have fewer service responsibilities 
by including a dichotomous variable in the regression models coded 1 for county councils and 
0 for all the others. 
To ensure temporal causality runs in the correct direction, the independent variables are 
measured in the year preceding the dependent variables. Descriptive statistics for all the 
variables are reported in Table 1. Due to missing or questionable financial data, a small number 
of data points for some local governments are excluded.7 In addition, we do not include the city 
of Birmingham in our analysis because it is an extreme outlier, with an interest in more than 







We use a Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB) regression model to account for over-
dispersion and an excess of zeroes in our dataset (Cameron and Trivedi 1998). The variance of 
the company count (11.47) is more than three times larger than the mean (3.41). In addition, 
there seem to be an ‘excessive’ number of zeroes in our data set - approximately 20% (see 
Figure A2 in the Appendix). ZINB models extend the single-equation negative binomial (NB) 
model by introducing a two-stage process which can incorporate zeroes in the data-generating 
process. In our case, the first stage of the model includes a logit regression predicting the 
probability of whether a local government will have any companies at all during the study 
period. There may be “always zeroes” in our data set for two key reasons. Firstly, some local 
governments may have experienced less financial pressure than others (Gray and Barford 
forthcoming). Therefore, we add three of our financial measures to the logit part of the model 
(grant revenue reductions; grant dependence; and, debt servicing as a % of revenues). Long-
term debt as a % of revenues is included in the NB part of the model, as a higher level of debt 
seems likely to be associated with more company creation. Secondly, in-house public service 
provision may reflect the ideology of a left-wing ruling party. Hence, in the logit part of the 
model, we include the Labour Party control variable. This also reduces the potential collinearity 
present if the Labour and Conservative variables were both included in the NB model. 
Following estimation of the logit part of the ZINB model, the second stage, i.e. the NB 
equation estimates the determinants of corporatization, given that a local government is willing 
to corporatize services, as predicted by the logit part of the model (see Cameron and Trivedi 
1998). Our choice of a ZINB model over a Poisson or single equation-NB model is supported 
by Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) for the fitted 
models. Furthermore, since the variation year-on-year in companies is not large and in many 
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cases zero, NB estimates with random or unit-fixed effects failed to converge, so we regard our 
ZINB models as the most robust approach for our analysis. 
 
Statistical Results 
Tables 2 and 3 present the ZINB regressions estimating corporatization/company ownership 
and local governments’ involvement in/ownership of companies limited by shares and 
companies limited by guarantee for 2010-2016. For all six dependent variables, model 1 
regresses the company count indicator on to the independent variables, whereas model 2 
includes squared versions of the administrative intensity and CEO and CFO tenure variables to 
estimate whether particularly low and high values of those variables are associated with 
corporatization. The average Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) score for the independent 
variables in the models is below three, suggesting the results are not distorted by 
multicollinearity. Logged versions of the population and GVA variables are used to correct for 




The results of the logit models suggest, first, as anticipated, that financial factors 
influence the likelihood of having zero company involvement and company ownership. In 
particular, the coefficients for grant dependence and debt servicing are negative and statistically 
significant in nearly all of the models. Hence, local governments experiencing these fiscal 
challenges appear (on average) to be more likely to have set up companies. However, the 
coefficient for the grant reductions variable is positive and statistically significant in several of 
the models, suggesting that local governments whose grant allocation has decreased are more 
likely to have no company involvement. This finding, though contrary to our expectations, 
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mirrors that from previous research on the reluctance among US cities experiencing fiscal stress 
to set up public enterprises (Rubin 1988). The coefficient for Labour political control, is 
negative in all of the logit models, but only reaches statistical significance for the model 
predicting ownership of companies limited by guarantee. Thus, left-wing political control does 
not increase the likelihood of having no companies at all, but is associated with ownership of 
at least one non-profit entity – corroborating studies of the sectoral outsourcing preferences of 




The NB part of the models predicts the number of companies in which local 
governments have an interest or a controlling share. First, we note that inclusion of the county 
council variable to control for local governments’ service responsibilities appears justified – 
the coefficient for the variable is negative in all of the models, and achieves statistical 
significance in some of them. Furthermore, the NB models indicate that debt is a statistically 
significant predictor of corporatization and of company ownership. However, these findings 
do not apply for involvement in and ownership of non-profit entities, thereby affirming our 
hypothesis that financial pressures are more likely to increase involvement in profit-making 
entities – something also suggested by the weaker results for grant dependence and debt 
servicing in the logit models predicting non-profit ownership.  
To understand the substantive effects of the coefficients for each NB model we 
computed discrete changes in the dependent variable given a one standard deviation (SD) 
change in the independent variable(s), while holding all other independent variables at their 
means (see Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix).9 These figures indicate that a one SD increase 
in debt as a % of revenue is associated with involvement in almost one (Model 1 = .839/Model 
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2 = .862) further company, with over a third of such increased corporatization being accounted 
for by a local government-owned entity (.385/.375). These changes are more likely to be 
observed for involvement in or ownership of profit-making than non-profit entities.  
Our second hypothesis regarding the correlation between socio-economic complexity 
and corporatization is confirmed for some of the variables. In particular, the coefficient for 
population is positive and statistically significant in all six models, and its substantive effect is 
very strong. The discrete change estimates indicate that a one SD increase in population is 
associated with the addition of more than one (1.315/1.222) further company to a local 
government’s portfolio, which is likely to be owned by that government (.960/.910). This effect 
is stronger for companies limited by shares than by guarantee. Involvement in companies also 
appears to be an attractive option for local governments serving deprived communities, with a 
one SD increase in deprivation associated with involvement in more than one new company 
(1.204/1.181) – involvement which appears to be evenly split between profit-making and non-
profit making entities. This may signal ‘necessity being the mother of invention’ (Kelman 
2006). However, deprivation is not associated with company ownership, suggesting that local 
governments serving disadvantaged communities prefer to partner up with other organizations 
to corporatize services, rather than shoulder all of the risk themselves. 
The coefficient for age diversity is positive in all of the models, but does not achieve 
statistical significance in the models predicting involvement with non-profit-making entities. 
By contrast, the coefficient for ethnic diversity is negative in all of the models, and achieves 
statistical significance at the 5% level for all four models predicting involvement in profit-
making entities. These results suggest local governments may use corporate entities to meet 
the demands of different age groups to raise additional revenue, but that corporatization to 
serve different ethnic groups is less financially or politically viable. The discrete change scores 
indicate that only the relationship between age diversity and company ownership per se is 
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substantively and statistically significant at the 5% level. Hence, more detailed assessment of 
the market conditions for different types of corporatized services is required to understand 
corporatization in demographically heterogeneous areas.   
Contrary to our expectations, we have no evidence to suggest that population density 
has a relationship with corporatization – a finding confirmed by the discrete change estimates. 
While there is no evidence that economic output determines involvement in companies, the 
results shown in Table 3 indicate that company ownership is more prevalent in economically 
productive areas, especially of profit-making entities. The discrete change estimates indicate 
that a two SD increase in GVA is associated with ownership of nearly one additional company 
limited by shares. This finding that governments in economically vibrant areas are more 
enthusiastic about company ownership stands in stark contrast with the reluctance of their 
counterparts in economically deprived areas to own companies.    
Regarding our third hypothesis, there is no evidence of a relationship between right-
wing party rule and corporatization: the coefficient for Conservative Party control does not 
achieve statistical significance in the ZINB models or the discrete change estimates. For our 
fourth hypothesis, when the squared versions of the capabilities measures are added to the 
model we find evidence of non-linear effects. The coefficient for the ‘base’ administrative 
intensity variable is negative and statistically significant in four out of the six models at the 
same time that the squared version of the variable is positive and statistically significant. In 
line with the standard interpretation of the inclusion of squared variables in regression models 
(Clark, Oswald and Warr 1996), this indicates the presence of a u-shaped relationship between 
administrative intensity and corporatization. More specifically, our results imply that 
corporatization in general, and involvement in profit-making companies in particular, is more 
prevalent in governments with very low or very high administrative intensity.10 
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The discrete change estimates indicate that shifts in administrative intensity have a 
potentially sizeable substantive effect on corporatization: a two SD increase in this variable 
would be associated with the subtraction of more than one company from a local government’s 
portfolio up until the tipping point after which it would be associated with the addition of more 
than one company. As anticipated, these substantive effects are only observed for the creation 
of companies limited by shares. 
Although we observe a u-shaped relationship between administrative intensity and 
corporatization, we find very little evidence of a similar relationship between CEO or CFO 
tenure and involvement in or ownership of companies. Local governments with more 
experienced CFOs seem to be less likely to own companies, which may reflect risk-aversion 
on the part of the senior managers with the greatest responsibility for balancing the budget. 
Nevertheless, overall, it seems that corporatization may be driven by gaps or strengths in 
administrative capacity rather than managerial experience. 
 
Discussion 
Our analysis indicates that financial and socio-economic factors may be more important 
predictors of corporatization than managerial or political factors. In particular, debt and grant 
dependence, and a large client population, all seem to be critical influences, with socio-
economic disadvantage, economic output and age diversity also associated with specific forms 
of company creation and operation. Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that administrative 
intensity and the political control of local governments matter in some circumstances as well.  
Our results provide support for arguments about the nature of systemic public 
entrepreneurship (Bernier and Hafsi 2007) and post-NPM organizational hybridization (e.g. 
Thynne and Wettenhall 2004), and reaffirm the transaction costs perspective advanced in prior 
European studies of corporatization (e.g. Tavares 2017). In the internationally large English 
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local governments that we analyze (see John 2010), where many viable alternative service 
delivery models are available, including a thriving commercial outsourcing industry (Julius, 
2008), local decision-makers appear to increasingly favour corporatizing services. This 
development suggests that local governments’ systemic entrepreneurship is being shaped by 
their long experience of the high transaction costs associated with contracting out (Wollman 
2018). This finding has relevance in terms of the emerging research on other European local 
government systems. Here, the ability of politicians to retain control appears to be important 
in the choice of corporatizing services (e.g. Tavares and Camoes 2007), possibly because of 
greater sensitivity to citizen demands in these typically smaller local government units. Thus 
political control of services may be inversely related to size as a motivator for corporatization 
rather than another form of arm's length service provision.  Nonetheless, our research and that 
in other European countries indicates that local governments generally seem to prefer creating 
profit-making rather than nonprofit entities, indicating that the death of NPM and 
managerialism may have been exaggerated (Pollitt 2016). 
In addition, our analysis suggests that managerial capabilities should be incorporated 
more fully in research on corporatization. Administrative capacity has been shown to influence 
contracting out in US school districts (O’Toole and Meier 2004), but has seldom been evaluated 
in relation to the creation of government-owned companies. Although we do not identify a 
direct relationship between CEO or CFO tenure and corporatization, our finding that very low 
and very high administrative intensity matter is a valuable one. Other indicators of individual 
managerial capability, such as years of business experience or a large salary, may, of course, 
be salient, as research on public entrepreneurship in hybrid public-private organizations 
suggests (e.g. Cabral 2017). However, extensive biographical information is not available for 
all local public managers in England.11 Even then, it may be the case that for the decision to 
corporatize public services, the quality of the relationships between senior managers and 
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politicians is ultimately more important than individual capabilities. Hence, qualitative case 
studies would cast valuable light on the mechanisms that make corporatization happen within 
the decision-making structure of local governments.   
Practically speaking, for practitioners and policy-makers, information on the 
determinants of corporatization, can help to guide their thinking about when it may be most 
appropriate to corporatize services. For example, if, as we find, many local governments 
experiencing grant reductions do not create companies, then for hard-pressed public 
organizations in-house provision may be preferable. Nevertheless, it would still be vitally 
important to know if corporatized public service delivery results in better public management 
outcomes than either in-house provision or contracting out, whether this varies by service area 
and what modes of political and managerial accountability are most effective. A comprehensive 
research agenda building on the limitations of our study could therefore illuminate the 
implications of this distinctive form of public entrepreneurship for the theory and practice 
public administration in several valuable ways.  
Firstly, due to the nature of the data and estimators that we employ, we only identify 
levels of association between key variables. Studies utilising quasi-experimental designs could 
examine the causal mechanisms relating to the antecedents and effects of corporatization. For 
example, preliminary analysis using Granger tests suggests that corporatization may have a 
reciprocal relationship with debt, leading to further borrowing by local governments. In-depth 
investigation of the dynamics of corporatization, would therefore provide vital knowledge 
about the potential for this form of public entrepreneurship to meet its intended aims.  
Secondly, we examine a particular group of public organizations during a period of 
fiscal challenge, so it would be especially important to explore whether the results we observe 
here differ in other time periods and organizational settings. For instance, because there is no 
comprehensive publicly available data on union membership at the local government level in 
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England, we are unable to investigate the impact of unionization on this occasion. However, 
this is something that should certainly be incorporated within future studies if at all possible. 
Indeed, cross-country comparative research may be essential to help pinpoint the precise role 
that different administrative, legal and political traditions play in the corporatization of public 
services.  
Finally, research comparing the financial and non-financial performance of different 
types of companies and ownership structures would provide invaluable evidence that could 
help policy-makers identify the most promising forms of corporatization. Researchers seeking 
to understand why, and in what circumstances, some local government companies succeed but 
others fail, should also investigate whether the adoption of hybrid managerial strategies is 
necessary to enable these hybrid organizations achieve the goals that are set for them.   
 
Notes 
1 The UK financial year runs from 1st April to 31st March. 
2 There was limited relief from this in 2016/17 in relation to increases in taxation hypothecated 
for social care expenditure. 
3 Our study does not cover the 201 lower tier district councils, which are responsible for a 
smaller range of services within each county council (upper tier) area and have significantly 
lower levels of expenditure. 
4 The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) advanced group accounting standards 
- International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 10 Consolidated Financial Statements, 
IFRS 11 Joint Arrangements, and IFRS 12 Disclosure of Interests in Other Entities - to address 
concerns from the financial crisis 2008 that certain risky arrangements were being excluded 
from company balance sheets. The public sector adopted these standards, including local 
government in England. IFRS 10 addressed consolidated financial statements issues by 
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importantly revising the definition of having "control" of another entity, and requiring that 
entity to be consolidated onto the controlling entity's balance sheet. IFRS11 addressed joint 
ventures and through adopting the IFRS 10 definition of "control" means "joint control" is 
deemed to exist in some circumstances where it wasn't previously. IFRS 12 addressed 
disclosures of interests in other entities and requires disclosures related to subsidiaries, joint 
ventures and interests in other entities that are not consolidated to be combined into a single 
disclosure. It also requires disclosures about judgements used to determine whether control 
exists, why it determined that control did not exist and its relationship with entities it did not 
consolidate. 
5 The Public Works Loan Board is a central government agency that made loans to local 
governments. It was abolished in 2017 after 223 years of operation, and its functions transferred 
to the UK Treasury.    
6 The UK government’s deprivation index is commonly used by both scholars and practitioners 
to analyse socio-economic pressures in local governments across the country. It is a composite 
score based on administrative data that are used to construct six Indices of Deprivation, namely: 
the employment scale (the number of people who are unable to work due to unemployment, 
sickness or disability); the income scale (the number of people in receipt of means-tested 
welfare benefits); the average of ward scores (the population weighted average of the combined 
employment and income scales for the neighbourhoods in a local area); the average of ward 
ranks (the population weighted average of the combined employment and income ranks for the 
neighbourhoods in a local area); the extent of deprivation (the proportion of the local 
population living in neighbourhoods which rank within the most deprived 10% of 
neighbourhoods in the country); and, local concentration (the population weighted average of 
the ranks of a local area’s most deprived neighbourhoods that contain exactly 10% of the area’s 
population). The IoD are updated every few years by the Ministry for Housing, Communities 
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and Local Government. The IoD for 2007, 2010 and 2015 are all included in the dataset 
employed for our analysis. 
7 We lose 29 local government-year observations (about 2.5%), which is unlikely to influence 
our findings, since the analysis is based on the population of single and upper-tier local 
governments. 
8 To further test the potential for political ideology to matter, we substituted a dichotomous 
variable capturing the ideological strength of left-wing local governments for the Labour-
control variable in the logit part of the model. This was done by considering Labour-controlled 
governments as especially left-wing or ‘Old’ Labour’ (and coding them 1) if they had been 
continuously controlled by the Labour party since the local elections prior to the election of 
Tony Blair’s ‘New’ Labour national government in 1997. All other Labour-controlled 
governments were then recoded 0. Inclusion of this variable in our models made little 
difference to our findings and was not related to corporatization (results available on request). 
9 Here, we deployed discrete change analysis using the mchange function in STATA, which 
has recently been developed to illustrate the marginal effects of changes in the unstandardized 
coefficients on categorical and count outcomes, such as those we use. For more information on 
mchange, see J. Scott Long and Jeremy Freese. 2014. Regression Models for Categorical 
Dependent Variables Using Stata, Third Edition. College Station, TX: Stata Press.  
10 Further analysis revealed that the turning points for the statistically significant administrative 
intensity variables were between 4.9% and 5.2%, respectively, about two standard deviations 
above the mean administrative intensity level. Twenty-five local governments had 
administrative intensity above this turning point in at least one of the years between 2010 and 
2016. 
11 To investigate the potential impact of former private sector experience, basic information on 
the careers of the CEOs in each local government was gathered by searching documentary 
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evidence available online, including LinkedIn profiles, local government webpages and 
minutes, and local newspaper and trade journal articles. Through this process, we were able to 
identify whether a CEO had private sector experience prior to taking up their post in about 90% 
of cases. Nevertheless, inclusion of a dichotomous variable coded 1 for private sector 
experience and 0 otherwise for a reduced sample of local governments made little difference 
to our findings and was unrelated to corporatization (available on request). Nevertheless, it is 
conceivable that the number of years of private sector experience is a more important influence 
on corporatization than the mere fact of such experience. However, that level of detail on the 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics (2010-2016) 
 Mean Min Max SD Skew 
Dependent variables*      
Corporatization (number of 
companies in which an interest is 
held) 
3.42 0 16 3.39 1.32 
Companies limited by shares in 
which an interest is held 
1.70 0 13 1.94 1.39 
Companies limited by guarantee 
in which an interest is held 
1.27 0 12 1.79 2.61 
All companies (50% ownership or 
more)  
1.80 0 13 2.20 2.06 
Companies limited by shares 
(50% ownership or more) 
.94 0 12 1.41 2.21 
Companies limited by guarantee 
(50% ownership or more) 
.55 0 6 .89 2.99 
Independent variables      
Grant reductions (% annual 
change) 
-.03 -80.73 56.45 18.06 1.82 
Grant dependence (%) 58.39 34.38 93.66 7.50 .46 
Debt (£’s) as (%) share of revenue 
expenditure 
60.00 0 198.97 33.67 1.03 
Debt service (£’s) as (%) share of 
revenue expenditure 
2.84 -2.5 27.21 2.07 1.73 
Population 340669.2 34563 1463740 254459.2 2.20 
Population density 2580.61 61.12 13741.67 2936.53 1.80 
Socio-economic deprivation 23.16 5.36 46.97 8.55 .29 
Age diversity 8761.59 8419.95 8875.93 85.26 -1.48 
Ethnic diversity 3167.1 372.71 8915.3 2473.19 .86 
GVA (£’s) per capita 24455.01 12003 225818 18562.13 6.61 
Conservative control .41 0 1 .49 .37 
Labour control .41 0 1 .49 .39 
Administrative intensity 2.54 0.02 11.38 1.31 .99 
CEO tenure 5.24 0# 24 4.24 1.48 
CFO tenure 4.30 0# 13 2.98 .73 
County council .18 0 1 .38 1.68 
Number of observations = 1015. *Some of the dependent variables are skewed due to the large number of 
zeroes in the dataset. This is accommodated through the logit part of the zero-inflated binomial regression 
model. # tenure of 0 years is recorded when a CEO/CFO is not in place. 
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Table 2 Determinants of corporatization in major English local governments 
 Corporatization Companies limited by 
shares 
Companies limited by 
guarantee 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
NB model (count of companies)  
    









































































































































CEO tenure²  .022  
(.009) 








































Logit model (no companies) 
      


























Debt servicing (£) as share 

























Wald chi² 74.72** 100.08** 47.84** 95.43** 40.25** 45.57** 
Log likelihood -2233.32 -2222.45 -1658.06 -1628.99 -1464.27 -1462.51 





Table 3 Determinants of company ownership in major English local governments 
 All companies Companies limited by 
shares 
Companies limited by 
guarantee 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
NB model (count of companies)  
    








































































































































CEO tenure²  .002  
(.003) 








































Logit model (no companies) 
      


























Debt servicing (£) as share 

























Wald chi² 69.46** 87.04** 37.58** 57.74** 42.88** 44.30** 
Log likelihood -1733.17 -1726.10 -1246.94 -1232.33 -931.99 -931.55 













Table A1 Determinants of corporatization in major English local governments (discrete 
change estimates) 
 Corporatization Companies limited by 
shares 
Companies limited by 
guarantee 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
NB model (count of companies)  
    








































































































































CEO tenure²  .295  
(.501) 













































Table A2 Determinants of company ownership in major English local governments (discrete 
change estimates) 
 All companies Companies limited by 
shares 
Companies limited by 
guarantee 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
NB model (count of companies)  
    








































































































































CEO tenure²  .139  
(.366) 



















































Figure A2 Frequency distribution of local government companies, 2010-2016 
 
 
 
